Some advice from the Rand Corporation. How are America's interests (whatever those are) best served?
- Samuel Charap.
- The Rand Corporation.
- Click here for the article.
Some observers have welcomed the prospect of a protracted war as an opportunity both to dramatically weaken Russia and to undermine Putin’s regime. But the reality is that Putin has already done astounding damage to his country’s power, prestige, and economic prospects. A long war in Ukraine might push that process of decline and marginalization too far, too fast— turning Russia into a massive version of North Korea—and thus threaten three key long-term U.S. objectives.
First, Washington has an interest in long-term stability and a durable peace in a postwar Ukraine and along Russia’s periphery to reduce the likelihood of a conflict like this in the future. In addition to a massive humanitarian and economic aid effort to stabilize Ukraine, this will require follow-on consultations with all parties concerned—Russia, Ukraine, Russia’s other neighbors, and the West. Talks should be aimed at agreeing on rules of the road that would minimize the risk of a future war involving Russia and its neighbors.
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Second, although the United States and its allies should hold Russia accountable for the war, it will be important to avoid transforming the country into a basket case, an incorrigible international spoiler, or both. This will inevitably prove a difficult balancing act. Some of the punitive sanctions and other measures imposed on Russia for its aggression will likely have to remain in place. But a severe enough economic shock could destabilize the country, returning to the nightmare scenario from the 1990s, of a Russia in chaos.
. . . Even if Russia does not transform into an economic basket case, it might well become a rogue actor. Moscow demonstrated many rogue-like tendencies before the war as seen in its 2014 annexation of Crimea and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. If all incentives for moderation are gone, those tendencies would likely become the norm. And if Russia begins to behave like a determined international spoiler, in the manner of North Korea, it could drag down much of what remains of the multilateral system, including the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the UN Security Council.
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Finally, although it is clear that Russia’s aggression will leave it far more dependent on China regardless of what Washington does now, the United States does have a long-term interest in avoiding a new bipolarity. A Russia completely dependent on China—and a China willing to underwrite Putin’s regime—could bring the two into a de facto alliance to counter the United States and its allies. Such an outcome could exacerbate Washington’s challenges in its long-term competition with Beijing.
These three long-term interests—achieving regional stability, discouraging Russia from turning into an international rogue, and precluding a new bipolarity—should not stop U.S. policymakers from imposing costs on Putin and his regime. But they should inform U.S. decision-making. A negotiated peace in the coming weeks that allows for some sanctions relief would be a necessary first step toward pursuing all three. Otherwise, continued regional conflicts, a Russian economic implosion, increased global disorder, and a de facto Moscow-Beijing alliance all become more likely long-term outcomes.