A major topic in both 2301 and 2302 is whether judicial elections compromise judicial independence by making judges subject to the preferences of donors. This story points out the problems unlimited donations in judicial campaigns has posed for the ability of the Florida court to be independent.
I want 2302s, especially, to read through this since we will discuss the problems posed by elections soon enough, but 2301s should look through this as well since it touches both on elections and interest groups. It's also worth considering what these large donations can do to the separated powers, especially on the state level. Large scale donors can use elections to influence who dominates each of the three supposedly separate branches. If successful, the branches can work in tandem and there may be no way for opponents to inhibit what they do.
But maybe I'm paranoid.
Here's a chunk of the story, which calls state judges sitting ducks:
Judicial elections have long drawn the interest of wealthy
benefactors, business and labor groups, and trial lawyers, but watchdog
groups say they are particularly troubled by a new trend: The universe
of big donors has grown smaller and more concentrated.
In a 2010 study that examined 29 judicial races, the watchdog group Justice at Stake
found that the top five spenders averaged $473,000 apiece, while all
other donors averaged $850. In addition, loopholes in disclosure laws
gave those big donors ways to spend money “in substantial secrecy,” the
report found.
“Outside forces are becoming a bigger deal,” said Roy Schotland,
a Georgetown University law professor and expert on judicial elections.
“We’re seeing more takeover of the races from the outside.”
Schotland
said state judicial races are increasingly becoming “floating
auctions,” in which special-interest groups focus money and manpower in
states where they can upend judges they don’t like. “The justices are
like sitting ducks,” he said.
