The New York Review of Books has an analysis of how China's authoritative system has adapted in order to more effectively calm local rebellions.
. . . “adaptive authoritarianism.” As Peter L. Lorentzen of the University of California, Berkeley, has written, officials view protests as way to gauge popular discontent. Small-scale protests function as a feedback mechanism for the government of a country without an active civil society or elections. Far from being a harbinger of regime change, Lorentzen argues that, in China at least, they can stabilize the regime.
So while the regime overall remains repressive, it is taking a more nuanced approach to dealing with discontent. Bending, not breaking -- if that's an appropriate analogy. Limits still exist on what peopel can protest however:
. . . the government only allows the discussion to go so far. It’s okay to say that local officials are corrupt or that the real estate deal in question was wrong. But it is not acceptable to have protesters link up with each other in a national network. And it is certainly not acceptable to criticize the root cause of Wukan’s problems—China’s lack of checks and balances that allow local officials to rule like warlords for decades before local finally explode and the problems are finally addressed. These deep-structure issues are still taboo.
The greater degree of economic freedom allowed in China over the past two decades has led many to wonder when - not it - calls for political freedom will be heard throughout the nation. Western political theorists have always held that economic freedom precedes political freedom and that the latter inevitable follows the former. Perhaps this is a way for the regime to delay that transition, if not prevent it altogether.
As Chinese have become wealthier and better educated, they are demanding more control over their lives. In a more mature political system, civil society—the press, courts, non-governmental organizations, and civic associations—could help address situations like a village protest before they require the direct intervention of one of the country’s most powerful politicians.
It’s no coincidence either that the Wukan uprising was spurred by another growing worry in China: the country’s mounting economic challenges. China’s real estate bubble is deflating, inflation remains stubborn, and exports are facing new competition. These can only add to tensions in society, forcing leaders to stick more and more of their fingers in the political system’s holes. But given the élan of China’s millennia-old bureaucracy, the system itself does not seem at risk, at least in the absence of some far larger precipitating event. In the meantime, the lessons of Wukan may be that the country’s leaders can leap from wall to wall, plugging leaks and keeping the system working far longer than westerners can imagine.
The regime may be more solid than we think.
