A point I briefly make in the introductory slides in 2301 is that democracies tend to develop in places where a strong middle class has evolved and pushes for political power. The Moscow Times argues that despite setbacks in recent years, including apparent attempts by Vladimir Putin to consolidate control of the nation, a Russian middle class is asserting itself.
People who study democratization often argue that economic freedom - market reforms - have to preceed political freedom. Increased per capita wealth - especially is it is spread somewhat equitably - give people the autonomy and strength to participate politically and to effectively make demands on government. The authors argues that the basis for a transformation to democracy has already been laid in Russia, but the market transformation has to be supported by the vigorous political class. Increased per-capita income seems to be allowing for the necessary political support:
While market reforms brought substantial prosperity — average annual per capita GDP at purchasing power parity is now $17,000 — a large middle class, based mostly in small and medium-sized companies and the service sector, all developed beyond the reach of the state-owned behemoths. Most of this middle class also lives in large cities, where the battle for the country's future is now taking place.
The demands of this middle class have become crucial. Its representatives understand that they must win the battle against corruption or leave the country, as they would, otherwise, have no future in Russia. That is why they have rallied around the young blogger Alexei Navalny, whose WikiLeaks-like anti-corruption campaign has brought forth evidence of billions of dollars stolen from state-owned companies, luxury limousines bought by officials and spectacular business careers by the ruling elite's "wunderkinder" sons and daughters.
[note: the need for a press to distribute information to a population ready to consume it and to work on it. This includes the ability to engage in sedition - accusing government of corruption. Legal freedoms have to be established and enforced]
The evidence of corruption produced by Navalny and the nickname he gave to Putin's political party, United Russia — "the party of crooks and thieves" — were perhaps the single most important factors behind United Russia's large losses in December's State Duma elections. Moreover, massive electoral fraud galvanized middle-class grievances, driving tens of thousands of protesters into the streets.
[note here the right to assemble]
Ironically, the wave of protests since then is consistent with the "modernization hypothesis" that Putin's government has always used to justify the rollback of democracy in Russia: Democracy is sustainable only if society is sufficiently well-off and has a solid middle class; until then, centralized rule is needed.
Now, it seems, sufficient prosperity has arrived, calling forth a middle class solid enough to demand government accountability, the rule of law and a genuine fight against corruption. Whatever happens in the March presidential election, the political mobilization of the middle class will eventually lead to democratization.
This is worth a class discussion. We might also wonder whether democracies once established can descend into a more tyrannical or autocratic form if the middle class checks out, or if freedoms to speak, assemble and use the press are curtailed.
