- Click here for the post.
Law enforcement agencies get additional revenue from forfeitures resulting from drug convictions, and they have grown used to - even dependent upon - that revenue. They are not that happy about the legalization of marijuana. Local law enforcement in states that have legalized marijuana are finding ways around it:
When voters in Colorado and Washington state approved legalizing marijuana in 2012, those votes undermined an abusive—and profitable—police practice: civil forfeiture. Unlike with criminal forfeiture, undercivil forfeiture people do not have to be convicted of or even charged with a crime to permanently lose their cash, cars, and other property. Police can then auction off that seized property and use the proceeds to fund themselves. In the 42 states that allow police departments to profit from forfeiture, that cash flow has funded both themilitarization of police and allowed law enforcement to make ridiculous purchases, including a margarita machine, a Hawaiian vacation, and a Dodge Viper.
In Colorado and Washington, the federal government processed more than $36 million worth of cash and other property in civil and criminal marijuana forfeitures between 2002 and 2012. Pursuing cannabis cases earned local law enforcement in Washington an additional $6 million to $9 million in forfeiture revenue since 2008. Nationwide, the Wall Street Journal reported the federal government scored $1 billion in forfeiture from marijuana cases over the past decade.
Legalization now threatens that forfeiture revenue for the police departments that have relied on it. Legal cannabis and the subsequent drop in forfeiture have already caused one drug task force in Washington to cut its budget by 15 percent. That’s great news for due process and property rights.
But marijuana is still illegal under federal law, so local legalization has created ambiguity in civil forfeiture proceedings. Even in states where recreational or medical marijuana is legal, property owned by innocent people is still at risk thanks to “equitable sharing.” This federal program lets local and state law enforcement do an end run around state law and profit from civil forfeiture, simply by collaborating with a federal agency.
In 2306 yesterday we looked at the following part of Article IV (Section 23) of the Texas Constitution:
The Comptroller of Public Accounts, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the Attorney General, and any statutory State officer who is elected by the electorate of Texas at large, unless a term of office is otherwise specifically provided in this Constitution, shall each hold office for the term of four years. Each shall receive an annual salary in an amount to be fixed by the Legislature; reside at the Capital of the State during his continuance in office, and perform such duties as are or may be required by law. They and the Secretary of State shall not receive to their own use any fees, costs or perquisites of office. All fees that may be payable by law for any service performed by any officer specified in this section or in his office, shall be paid, when received, into the State Treasury.
I may be wrong, but it appears to me that the part in bold is designed to prevent the activities mentioned above. Fees collected from an activity do not do to the department that collected them, but to the general treasury. This creates a disincentive for aggressive collection of the fee, since there is no direct benefit in doing so.
A subtle restriction on state governing power. I do not know if similar restrictions exists on the local level.
Next week - in 2306 - we discuss criminal justice policy. Obviously this reality encourages aggressive prosecution of drug laws, and also encourages law enforcement agencies to lobby to maintain them.
