Oyez outlines the facts of the case:
Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could not vote in the City of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be “overt involvement in political activities.” Heffernan sued the City of Paterson and claimed that the City had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech association. However, the City filed a motion for summary judgment on Heffernan’s free association claim. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself, that he was not associated with the candidate, therefore there is no evidence of a violation of free association. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Scotusblog breaks down the controversy:
The First Amendment limits, although does not preclude, patronage in public employment. A public employer cannot take adverse action against a non-political, non-policy-making employee — one holding a position for which political affiliation is not required for effective performance of the public office — because of that employee’s political and associational activity, such as voting for or supporting a candidate for office. But what if the employee suffered adverse action because of what the employer believed to be his political and associational activity, even though he was not actually engaged in any such activity? What if the employer, while explicitly intending to retaliate against the employee because of his political activity, was wrong about that activity?
For a timeline, click here.
