Through
Balikinization I found a link to
a research paper which argues - plausibly - that the concept of separated powers is best understood today to operate between political parties not governing institutions, as Madison had intended it to. This actually blows apart the argument we make in 2301, based on Federalist #51, that the most important division in American government is between the branches and that the factor that keeps them separated is ambition. The authors suggest instead that:
. . . we live under a legal regime of separation of powers, overlaid on a political regime in which the real separation is of parties. Usually, one major implication of this gap is that legislatures are more inclined to constrain executive power when government is divided, and more inclined to cede power to an executive of the same party.
Checks and balances only work, as the founders intended, during periods of divided government and not during periods of unified government.
